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 The refinement in worker fatality risk data used in hedonic wage studies and evidence 
from new stated preference studies have facilitated the exploration of the heterogeneity of the 
value of statistical life (VSL).  Although the median VSL estimate for workers is $7-$8 million, 
the VSL varies considerably within the worker population.  New estimates of the income 
elasticity of VSL are 1.0 or above, which are consistent with theoretical models linking VSL to 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  The specific relationship between VSL and risk aversion 
is, however, more complex than previously understood.  Age differences in VSL are substantial, 
with young children being accorded especially high VSL amounts.  The public’s willingness to 
pay to reduce risks is reduced if those being protected are perceived as being blameworthy due to 
their responsibility for contributing to the risk. 
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The value of statistical life (VSL) is not a natural constant.  Individuals’ risk-money 
tradeoffs vary across the population and also vary over time for particular individuals as their age 
and economic circumstances change.  The heterogeneity of VSL has become more prominent 
both in terms of economics research and risk policy.  Much of the research on the heterogeneity 
of VSL has been stimulated by the availability of new, comprehensive fatality risk data that 
make it possible to construct risk variables that are more accurate measures of the worker’s job 
risk than previous measures.  There has also been a parallel development of the stated preference 
literature, which has addressed VSL heterogeneity issues ranging from the role of personal 
characteristics to blameworthy risky behavior.  This special issue of the Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty includes four articles that address novel theoretical and empirical issues relating to 
the heterogeneity of VSL.  Here I also summarize the key findings of several other papers that 
were presented at the Vanderbilt Law School Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life 
Conference.1 
 
The Policy Context 
 Although the application of VSL estimates to provide guidance with respect to policy 
decisions has not been without controversy, using uniform VSL estimates to monetize the 
benefits of risk regulations and other policies has become standard practice in the United States 
and in many other countries.2  Other than a few exceptions, the application of VSL estimates in 
                                                 
1 This conference was held at Vanderbilt Law School, March 27, 2009, and was sponsored by the Ph.D. Program in 
Law and Economics at Vanderbilt University. 
2 These practices were discussed at the conference by former Directors of the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Susan Dudley and John Graham, and by John F. Morrall, III, 
former Branch Chief in that office.  Other key government participants on this topic were three EPA officials: Brian 
Mannix, former Associate Administrator for Policy, Economics, and Innovation, Al McGartland, Director, National 
Center for Environmental Economics, and Alan Carlin, senior economist.  Graham (2008) provides a strong 
articulation of the importance of using VSL estimates for policy assessment based on his tenure directing the 
regulatory oversight effort. 
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the United States at any time has not extended beyond applying a single VSL number 
irrespective of the population whose risks are being reduced by the policy.  
The principal observed differences in VSL estimates have been over time.  Agencies 
usually increase their VSL amounts as new studies become available, where the VSL rises over 
time due both to the positive income elasticity of VSL and inflation.  Estimates of VSL amounts 
of $3 million and sometimes under $1 million that were used to assess policies in the early 1980s 
have now been replaced by VSL estimates as high as $9 million.3  The recognition that changes 
in societal income have contributed to the increase in VSL has largely been implicit, with no 
underlying economic mechanism typically being credited for the changes.  
Linking increases in the VSL figure for policy analyses to temporal changes in income 
has proven to be more readily embraced than differentiating VSL amounts across the population 
at a point in time.  Should reducing mortality risks reflect the valuations of those being protected, 
which will lead to higher VSL amounts for the more affluent?  One circumstance in which I have 
suggested that such differentiation would be less objectionable is when the beneficiaries of the 
policy are, in effect, paying for the safety costs themselves.4  The only U.S. agency to formalize 
the possible explicit recognition of income differences in setting the VSL amount either across 
populations or over time is the U.S. Department of Transportation.  That agency now permits the 
                                                 
3 Viscusi (1992) provides a historical account of my introduction of VSL estimates in U.S. policy contexts as part of 
the debate over the proposed hazard communication regulation in 1982 using a VSL of $3 million.  Subsequently, 
the U.S. Dept. of Transportation used VSL levels of $1 million or less, but has now increased its VSL to $5.8 
million. Viscusi (2009) reviews the recent policy debates over adjustments in VSL based on age, income, and more 
recent economic evidence.  The $9 million figure is in 2008 dollars and is for the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s 2005 economic analysis for the final stage 2 disinfectants and disinfection byproducts rule. 
4 Viscusi (1992) provides further discussion of this argument that was developed in support of higher VSL numbers 
for use by the Federal Aviation Administration. 
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use of an income elasticity adjustment of 0.55 based on the meta analysis of Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003).5  The guidelines did not specify how income considerations might enter.   
Many of the concerns regarding VSL as well as the adjustments that agencies make to 
VSL were reflected in U.S. congressional efforts to influence the agencies’ selection of the VSL.  
Senate Bill S. 3564 that was proposed in 2008 recognized the role of income adjustments, stating 
that the VSL amount must be increased annually to reflect changes in income.6  There was no 
provision for decreases in VSL if income levels decline, as the proposed legislation stipulated 
that VSL amounts can be increased but never decreased.  This restriction on the direction of 
adjustments for VSL amounts was stimulated by a downward adjustment in the VSL by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Air Office from $7.7-$7.8 million to $7.0 million in 
2008 dollars.  This reduction in VSL figures was based on that office’s assessment of the levels 
of VSL implied by its review of several recent VSL meta analyses.7  What was noteworthy about 
the criticism is that the EPA Air Office numbers remained among the highest in the federal 
government, and agencies using far lower VSL amounts were not targeted for criticism.  The 
direction of change in the VSL was most influential, as critics fell prey to the anchoring effect 
and status quo bias of the previous VSL figure.8 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, Revised 
Departmental Guidance: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic 
Analyses, August 2, 2005.  This memorandum cites the Viscusi and Aldy (2003) analysis and uses the midpoint of 
their estimated income elasticity of VSL range, which they found was from 0.5 to 0.6 based both on their 
specification of the meta analysis equation as well as when using the equation specifications following four previous 
studies. 
6 More specifically, VSL must be increased at least once a year to reflect “the average annual total compensation of 
individuals, including income and benefits.”  This bill, which was proposed by Senator Boxer, was titled the 
“Restoring the Value of Every American in Environmental Decisions Act,” proposed in the 110th Congress, 2d 
Session. 
7 In Viscusi (2009) I review and critique the EPA decision to lower the VSL.  While proper assessment of the meta 
analyses did not warrant a downward adjustment in the VSL, there could be circumstances in which a decrease in 
VSL would be appropriate. 
8 Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) discuss such status quo effects in a variety of contexts. 
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Income adjustments were not the only target of this congressional initiative.  The 
proposed legislation voiced general discomfort with VSL generally, claiming that “using a dollar 
value to establish the worth of human life as the basis for making decisions…offends many 
deeply held religious, moral, and ethical beliefs of people in the United States.”  The proposed 
legislation would also ban all recognitions of heterogeneity that reduced the VSL, as the VSL 
can never be decreased “based on age, income, race, illness, disability, date of death, or any other 
personal attribute or relativistic analysis of the value of life.”  While this legislation was never 
enacted, it does highlight the extreme sensitivity of research pertaining to the heterogeneity of 
the value of statistical life. 
The most prominent aspect of heterogeneity that has been recognized in policy 
assessments and which has aroused the greatest public controversy is the relation of VSL to age.  
Policies that reduce mortality risks do not confer immortality but simply reduce the probability 
of death from specific causes of death.  Because individual life expectancy declines with age, the 
commodity being valued becomes smaller with age.  Nevertheless, the person’s willingness to 
pay for reduced risks may not steadily decline with age.9  Individual income and consumption 
exhibit patterns of rising and falling over the life cycle, which is a trajectory that mirrors the 
estimated pattern of VSL in recent labor market studies.   Most recent labor market evidence 
suggests that the VSL exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship where the VSL of workers age 
60 is higher than that for workers age 20.10  This relationship mirrors that of the pattern of 
lifetime consumption, as one would expect on theoretical grounds and is documented empirically 
                                                 
9 With perfect capital markets and annuity markets that enable one to borrow against the present value of one’s 
discounted lifetime income at birth, VSL would decline with age.  Most realistic economic models show an 
inverted-U pattern to the VSL.  An early theoretical analysis is that of Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984). 
10 For a review of the labor market studies, see Aldy and Viscusi (2007).  Krupnick (2007) provides the counterpart 
review for survey-based studies.  The stated preference studies reflect more inconsistent age-related patterns than do 
the labor market studies. 
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in Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006), who analyze the relationship of personal consumption 
expenditures to VSL. 
The VSL-age relationship received national press attention when EPA used a 37% 
negative age adjustment in assessing the benefits of the Clear Skies initiative to those who are 
age 65 and older.11  This adjustment was based on surveys in the U.K. indicating age variation in 
VSL and, while not the first such sensitivity analysis to be undertaken by government agencies, 
it did receive the most widespread attention.12  Application of such a “senior discount,” also 
labeled the “senior death discount,” generated an outcry from senior citizen organizations such as 
AARP.  While VSL does eventually decline with age, use of empirical estimates of the VSL-age 
linkage in Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) found that proper application of evidence on the 
trajectory of VSL over the life cycle would have little effect on that policy’s benefit estimates 
that would be obtained without any age adjustment. 
There seems to have been less controversy in other countries that have recognized the 
pertinence of age in VSL analyses.  Canada has used a 25% discount to value risk reductions for 
people over the age of 65, and the European Commission has recommended that the VSL decline 
with age.13   
The other end of the age spectrum also merits attention to the extent that risks to the lives 
of children are valued differently.  If, however, the implications of the research are that children 
should be accorded a higher VSL, which the symposium articles show to be the case, recognition 
of that heterogeneity is tantamount to devaluing the lives of adults. How the heterogeneity 
                                                 
11 Examples of the discussions of this controversy in the press are “EPA Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,” New York 
Times, May 8, 2003, and “Under Fire, EPA Drops the ‘Senior Death Discount,’” Washington Post, May 13, 2003. 
12 Graham (2008) documents that in the Clinton Administration EPA used the results of two U.K. surveys indicating 
the appropriateness of age adjustments of -10% and -41%, which it incorporated in its analysis in 2000 of the 
highway diesel rule. 
13 These international practices are discussed in Aldy and Viscusi (2007). 
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distinctions are framed may play a pivotal role in determining their acceptability for policy 
analysis. 
The articles in this symposium illuminate the relation of VSL to income, individual job 
risk levels, risk taking behavior, age, and other personal attributes.  Although the articles address 
specific determinants of VSL estimates, it is useful to combine the factors into two general 
sources of heterogeneity—differences based on self selection into particular levels of safety for 
jobs, products, and activities, and differences based on underlying personal characteristics 
correlated with VSL amounts.  From an economic standpoint, the rationale for making 
distinctions on either of these two dimensions is equally compelling, but the social acceptability 
of making distinctions based on personal characteristics (e.g., age, race, and income) may be 
much more controversial than distinctions based on risk taking behavior, such as grossly 
negligent acts.  
 
Extending the Standard Hedonic Labor Market Model  
The VSL estimates used for U.S. policy purposes are based on labor market estimates of 
wage-fatality risk tradeoffs.  The hedonic labor market theory underlying these models can be 
illustrated using Figure 1.  Let W(p) be the market opportunities locus, or the highest wage rate 
available for any given risk p.  Worker 1 chooses the relatively safe job with risk p1, while 
worker 2 selects the riskier job 2 with risk p2 and wage w2(p2).  Since the VSL for each worker is 
the slope of the W(p) curve at the point of tangency with EU1 and EU2, the worker in the high 
risk job with risk p2 has a lower VSL than the worker in the low risk job with risk p1.  The 
conventional labor market model fits a curve through the locus of these various tangencies. 
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Research on the heterogeneity of VSL has been greatly stimulated by the development of 
much more refined labor market data on fatality risks.  These data were discussed at the 
Vanderbilt conference by John Ruser, Assistant Commissioner for Safety, Health, and Working 
Conditions, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.14  The Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) 
is the first fatality risk data base that provides a comprehensive census of all work-related 
fatalities. Each fatality is verified using multiple sources such as death certificates, workers’ 
compensation reports, and reports by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.15  
These fatality figures can be linked to different employment measures to calculate fatality rates 
by industry, occupation, age, race, gender, immigrant status, and other dimensions of interest. 
Labor market studies usually do not estimate the variation in the VSL with worker risk 
levels, though there are some exceptions.16  The conference paper by Evans and Schauer (2009) 
and the article by Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak in this issue use quantile regression methods to 
analyze how the tradeoff rate varies at different quantiles of the wage distribution.  As can be 
seen from Figure 1, analyzing variations in VSL at different levels of wages also provides 
information on the variation of VSL with the corresponding risk level.  Quantile regressions are 
used by Evans and Schauer (2009) to simultaneously analyze the effect of earnings heterogeneity 
and age, and they find that earnings heterogeneity is the more important source of heterogeneity.  
The conference paper by DeLaire, Khan, and Timmins (2009) similarly uses a Roy model to 
focus on the effect of worker sorting by risk level, finding that this selection process biases 
estimates of the VSL downward.  For all these papers, explicit recognition of the importance of 
                                                 
14 Ruser’s presentation was titled “BLS Workplace Safety and Health Data for VSLL Estimation.” 
15 The advent of this new risk data greatly diminishes the concerns with measurement error in the fatality risk 
variable voiced by Black and Kniesner (2003). 
16 Viscusi and Aldy (2003)  and Aldy and Viscusi (2007) review the previous labor market studies of variations in 
VSL with risk levels, income, and age. 
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the heterogeneity of VSL using either quantile regressions or a Roy model generates additional 
insight into the structure of wage compensation for risk.  
The core theoretical model underlying labor market studies of VSL is the hedonic wage 
equation model that fits a curve to the points of tangency to the offer curve W(p) in Figure 1.  
Doing so is instructive if workers face the same offer curves, as assumed by the theory.  
However, this may not be the case.17  Suppose that some worker group faces the lower and flatter 
wage offer curve V(p) in Figure 1.  Worker 3 will choose risk p2 for which that worker’s 
constant expected utility locus EU3 is tangent to the market offer curve.  That worker will have a 
lower VSL than does worker 2 who faces an identical risk but has different market opportunities.  
One test for such labor market segmentation is whether the compensating differential worker 3 
receives for risk given by w3(p2) – V(0) is less than what worker 2 receives for the same risk, or 
w2(p2) – W(0).  Even stronger evidence of such labor market segmentation is if the compensating 
differential received by worker 3 for risk p2 is below the compensating differential that worker 1 
receives for the smaller risk p1 given by w1(p1) – W(0). 
The conference paper by Hersch and Viscusi (2009) explored this segmentation process 
for legal, recent immigrants.  The risk variables they constructed for the analysis included refined 
measures such as fatality risks based on industry, immigrant status, and age.  Non-Mexican 
immigrant workers have labor market performance that is quite similar to that of native U.S. 
workers.  The average fatality risks for their jobs are almost identical to the rates for native U.S. 
workers, and the compensating differentials they receive for risk suggest that they are choosing 
jobs from an offer curve such as W(p) for native U.S. workers.  In contrast, Mexican workers 
face considerably higher risks than native U.S. workers and do not receive statistically 
                                                 
17 Viscusi and Hersch (2001) find that smokers and nonsmokers face different market offer curves, and Viscusi 




significant compensating wage differentials for fatality risk.   Mexican workers face greater risk 
and receive less risk compensation than do other workers, as in the comparison of workers 1 and 
3 in Figure 1.  The source of the labor market segmentation appears to be due to differences in 
language skills.  Other factors, such as previous illegal status, are not influential.  Such results 
consequently should serve to highlight the caution that should be exercised in determining the 
source of the VSL heterogeneity before incorporating such differences in policy assessments. 
 
Overview of Conference Papers in This Issue   
The first paper in the symposium volume, by Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak, examines the 
heterogeneity of labor market estimates of VSL, providing insight into the effects of both income 
and risk levels on VSL.  The article introduces a new econometric method to the VSL literature 
by employing quantile regression estimates of panel wage equations based on recently developed 
econometric methods that control for individual heterogeneity in the intercept of quantile 
regressions.  The fixed effect in these quantile regressions controls for person-specific 
heterogeneity as well as time-invariant endogeneity.  Previously, Kniesner, Viscusi, Woock, and 
Ziliak (2008) found that for the standard hedonic wage equation estimated using panel data that 
latent heterogeneity is a more influential econometric factor than the possible endogeneity of the 
fatality risk variable.  Thus, while the possible endogeneity of the fatality risk variable is a 
longstanding concern in the labor economics literature, its econometric importance is not great.  
In contrast, controlling for worker-specific heterogeneity is more consequential, and proves to be 
consequential for the quantile regressions as well.   
The estimated variation in the VSL across the wage quantiles is considerable.  Workers at 
the 0.10 wage quantile who face a fatality risk of 8 deaths per 100,000 workers have a VSL of 
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$3.5 million ($2001), while workers at the 0.90 wage quantile with a fatality risk of 4 per 
100,000 workers have a VSL of $22.0 million.  The VSL at the median is $7.6 million.  Workers 
with higher wages self select into safer jobs, as reflected in their estimated VSLs.  The existence 
of compensating differentials for risk is not so great as to offset other income-related influences.  
The income elasticity of VSL is at least 1.0 at all quantile values.  Regulatory agencies 
consequently should update the VSL proportionately with increases or decreases in income 
levels as well as with respect to cross sectional differences in income.  These income elasticity 
estimates exceed those implied by meta analyses of labor market VSL studies, which measure 
the elasticity across the average tradeoff rates in different studies as opposed to the within 
sample elasticity estimates presented here.  
The Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak article also presents empirical evidence pertinent to the 
longstanding objection to basing policy assessments on individuals’ willingness to pay without 
accounting for their ability to pay.  What if instead of valuing policies based on willingness to 
pay, the social welfare function valued the marginal value of risk reductions using the same 
amount for all citizens irrespective of their willingness to pay?  Based on the estimates in this 
paper and the implications of a social welfare function in which marginal reductions in risk are 
equally valued by all citizens, the authors show that such an approach will be less protective 
from a risk reduction standpoint than those based on VSL and willingness to pay. 
The article in this issue by Evans and Smith explores the theoretical underpinnings of the 
income elasticity of VSL both through conceptual models and empirical estimates of some of the 
key empirical components of such analyses.  Previous analyses by Eeckhoudt and Hammitt 
(2001) and by Kaplow (2005) used simple models to link the income elasticity of the VSL to the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA).  Kaplow showed that the CRRA establishes a lower 
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bound on the income elasticity of VSL.  There is an apparent inconsistency as theoretically the 
income elasticity of the VSL should be below the value of CRRA, but with some exceptions 
such as the Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak article in this issue, most labor market studies of the 
income elasticity of VSL have not found that to be the case.18  
The theoretical contribution of the Evans and Smith article is to relax some of the most 
stringent assumptions of previous models.  Their model permits variable labor supply and also 
recognizes the complementarity between consumption and labor supplied.  Even minor 
modifications of previous models generate ambiguity in the relationship between the income 
elasticity of VSL and the value of CRRA and, specifically, whether the value of CRRA 
establishes a floor for the income elasticity of VSL.  Further complicating this relationship is that 
there also may be constraints on labor supply adjustments, such as the consumption 
commitments associated with one’s mortgage payments, which will complicate workers’ short 
run labor supply responses to exogenous shocks. 
To explore the potential importance of labor supply responses to exogenous shocks in the 
presence of consumption commitments, Evans and Smith use data from the Health and 
Retirement Study.  They find strong evidence of the constraining effect of consumption 
commitments on labor supply adjustments.  Mortgage commitments and spousal medical shocks 
are the two key factors that they examine empirically.  These influences separately and in 
combination affect decisions to exit the labor force, bolstering their advocacy of a more general 
theoretical model than adopted in previous studies.  
The other two articles in this symposium volume utilize stated preference survey methods 
to value risk reductions. Hammitt and Haninger presented subjects with a risk context involving 
                                                 
18 It should be noted, however, that there are surprisingly few estimates of CRRA in the literature and considerably 
more estimates of the income elasticity of VSL, typically based on meta analyses of labor market VSL studies. 
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pesticide residues on food.  The substantive economic issues of interest pertained to respondents’ 
willingness to pay for reductions in the risk of death and trauma to the adults and children in the 
household.  A chief benefit of the survey approach as opposed to labor market studies is that it 
provides evidence regarding risk reductions for people outside the labor force, particularly for 
children.  To ensure that respondents were cognizant of the risks to family members other than 
themselves, the survey presented risk scenarios that focused on the risks to children. 
 The Hammitt and Haninger survey yielded estimates of VSL for adults of $6 million to 
$10 million that are quite similar to those found in labor market studies of adult workers.  The 
valuation of risks to children’s lives yielded estimates roughly double in magnitude, from $12 
million to $15 million.  These high values represent the altruistic concerns of the parents with 
children’s well-being.  If, as a policy approach, the parental values of VSL serve as the VSL 
measure up to age 18 and the person’s own VSL estimate is used thereafter, then used in 
conjunction with the labor market evidence in Aldy and Viscusi (2007) there will be a drop in 
VSL at age 18, followed by a subsequent increase.  Parents apparently place a greater protective 
value of a child’s life than the children will place on their own lives once they reach adulthood.  
Such a relationship may be a consequence of the combined influence of altruism and the income 
elasticity of VSL as parents are more affluent than their children will be at age 18. 
 That there may be such non-monotonic age-related patterns in the VSL implied by the 
Hammitt and Haninger valuations of children’s lives in conjunction with labor market evidence 
is borne out in the conference paper by Blomquist, Dickie, and O’Conor (2009).  They analyze 
willingness to pay to prevent fatal adverse reactions from asthma medications.  They find that the 
VSL peaks for young children and then declines until about age 30 after which it rises until age 
66 before beginning a decline.  The observed pattern for those of working age generally follows 
15 
 
the inverted-U shaped pattern of labor market studies.  This curve for adults is then augmented 
by their results for the younger age groups for which they find a pattern of declining VSL values 
from the early childhood peak. 
 The utilization of the stated preference survey approach enables Hammitt and Haninger 
to explore determinants of VSL linked to economic theory.  While the latency period has no 
significant effect on willingness to pay in their study, contrary to economic theory, there is a 
positive effect on VSL of the measure of risk aversion based on individuals’ stated levels of risk 
aversion.19  This result provides support for the economic analyses linking risk aversion and 
VSL, but does not have implications regarding the relative magnitude of the income elasticity of 
VSL and CRRA, which hinge on the specific model assumptions.  
The final article in this issue, by Covey, Robinson, Jones-Lee, and Loomes, explores the 
results of two stated preference surveys regarding railway safety in the United Kingdom.  Their 
focus is not on individuals’ willingness to pay to prevent risks to themselves but rather on 
societal valuations of reduced risks of death from various kinds of railway accidents, some of 
which may of course be risks to which the individual is exposed as well.  Thus, the money-
fatality risk tradeoffs being considered are not comparable to those in the other papers because 
they are from a quite different perspective. 
A major theme of their study is that the value people place on reducing risks is not 
uniform.  The main difference that their paper focuses on is that individual culpability that led to 
the person’s risk exposure affects the public’s willingness to prevent the accident.  At one 
extreme, passengers who are the victim of a derailment clearly did not contribute to the accident, 
whereas trespassers or suicides involve a greater degree of culpability.  The authors also 
distinguish accidents for adults and for children.  Particularly for adults, irresponsible behavior 
                                                 
19 Other measures of risk aversion were not significantly related to the willingness to pay values. 
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reduces the societal value, but this differential is less pronounced for children at risk.  A 
distinction between the culpability of adults and children is also made by most legal systems 
throughout the world.  
 Why people value saving the lives of those who are responsible for taking the risk and 
are viewed as being more blameworthy could be due to a variety of reasons.  To the extent that 
people have chosen very high risks through their contributory negligence, they have shown that 
they personally may have a low VSL.  If the prospective victims have a low VSL, then others 
may reason that society too might value risks to their lives less.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
the scenarios considered all involved revelation of low VSLs through reckless behavior rather 
than being the result of economic hardships that lead one to accept a dangerous job.  Another 
possible contributory factor to the difference in the valuations of the risk reductions is that the 
public generally is unwilling to provide assistance in situations in which they believe that there is 
substantial moral hazard.  Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006) found that after Hurricane Katrina that 
the public’s willingness to assist future hurricane victims was substantially diminished if people 
chose to move back to areas that would expose them to future hazards.  
For U.S. policy decisions, the voluntary/involuntary risk distinction has not been linked 
to adjustments for blameworthiness but rather has arisen most frequently in discussions of 
broadly based environmental risks.20  People who choose to work on dangerous jobs are a self 
selected group that is willing to bear risk, and EPA officials suggest that the VSL numbers used 
to protect people exposed to environmental hazards are not subject to the same self selection 
biases.  Whether there should be any adjustment for voluntary and involuntary risks depends on 
both the labor market study reference point and the characteristics of the environmental risk.  If 
                                                 
20 This distinction also arises in Section 4A of the bill S. 3564 introduced by Senator Barbara Boxer in 2008, 110th 
Congress, 2d Session, the “Restoring the Value of Every American in Environmental Decisions Act.”  However, 
that legislation proposes a premium for involuntary risks rather than a deduction for voluntary risks. 
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the VSL reference point is the average VSL for a broadly representative worker group rather 
than workers in very high risk jobs, the use of labor market estimates may be reflective of the 
VSL for the protected population.  Also, just as workers may choose jobs based on their wage-
risk tradeoffs, for many environmental conditions such as air pollution and hazardous waste, 
people likewise make a housing price-environmental risk tradeoff so that there are analogous 
market processes and self selection effects at work. 
While there have been many pleas for using higher VSL amounts for involuntary risks, 
we know of no policymakers who have advocated using lower VSL amounts for people who 
have chosen to incur large risks.  Should we use the same average societal VSL to evaluate 
safety regulations for those in extremely risky jobs with annual fatality risks of 1/1,000, or for 
regulations affecting cigarette smokers,  drunk drivers, or people who have chosen to live in 
highly polluted areas?  There is a clear asymmetry in the willingness of policymakers to draw 
distinctions.  
 
Policy Prospects for Incorporating the Heterogeneity of VSL 
The two aspects of VSL heterogeneity that have received the most economic analysis are 
differences by income and by age.  Each of these adjustments has had limited use in policy 
evaluations.  The effect of income on VSL is straightforward, as higher income boosts the VSL, 
while the influence of age is more complex. 
Reducing risks to life is a normal good with a positive income elasticity.   The magnitude 
of the elasticity is 0.5 to 0.6 based on meta analyses of labor market studies.  But these studies 
are not ideally suited to capturing the variation of the elasticity across the entire wage spectrum.  
There tends to be only modest variation in the typical worker captured in such studies.  Focusing 
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on the average worker across studies suppresses much of the elasticity variation.  At the extreme 
0.10 quantile, Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak found that the income elasticity is 2.24, while lower 
income elasticities closer to 1.0 were found at the upper quantiles.  Their empirical evidence is 
consistent with simple theoretical models of risk aversion and VSL indicating that the income 
elasticity of VSL implies that the VSL should increase proportionately with income if the CRRA 
is around 1.0.   
The influence of age on VSL is not monotonic.  At the bottom of the age spectrum, the 
VSL appears to be high, where this value is based on parents’ altruistic concerns for their 
children.  Beyond that age range, there is an inverted-U shape to the VSL for adults, but the 
decline in VSL at very old age groups does not appear to be stark.  One possible exception might 
be for people with extremely short remaining life spans, such as those with terminal illnesses, for 
whom one could use the value of statistical life year measure to assess the benefits of reducing 
their risks.21   
There will be efficiency gains if policies can be targeted to reflect the well established 
evidence regarding the heterogeneity of VSL.  Suppose that there are two types of transportation 
safety policies, improved guardrails that affect a broad mix of the population and airline safety 
regulations that affect higher income citizens.  Utilizing VSL estimates that incorporate the 
positive income elasticity of VSL will lead to regulations with a higher expected cost per life 
saved for airline safety regulations.  The resulting regulations will also be in line with the 
respective willingness to pay of the populations protected.  Particularly if airline passengers pay 
for the greater safety levels through higher ticket prices, there should be few valid reasons for 
any equity concerns.   
                                                 
21 People with severe respiratory ailments and little expected remaining life often are those who benefit from air 
pollution regulations.  For such populations, one might value the benefits using the value of statistical life year 
measure.  The value of statistical life year approach was advocated at the conference by Brian Mannix. 
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However, what if those protected by guardrails have below average VSL levels and those 
protected by airline safety regulations have above average levels.  While the efficient policy 
regime would structure the regulations to reflect the willingness to pay of the protected 
populations, one alternative is to establish a floor on the VSL equal to the population average.  
Guardrail policies will be designed using the average societal VSL, while airline safety policies 
can use a higher VSL.  This approach will use a higher average VSL for policy assessment than 
the actual population average but will lead to appropriate stringency of airline safety regulations 
and no greater inefficiency of guardrail regulations than would be the case if all policies were 
assessed using the same average societal VSL.  This imperfect hybrid policy consequently will 
be superior to ignoring heterogeneity altogether. 
Framing the heterogeneity adjustment may have a critical effect on its appeal.  Income 
adjustments for increasing the VSL over time or in recognition of the higher values of future 
generations are generally viewed favorably, while the equivalent adjustments for income 
differences at a given period of time are not.  Similarly, using a lower VSL for some age groups 
may strike some as morally offensive, but failure to make such adjustments will result in 
inordinately large differences in the value per statistical life year for these different age groups, 
which is a different form of inequity.  Incorporating the heterogeneity of VSL in policy 
assessments remains an ongoing challenge.  However, so long as there remain considerable 
imbalances between the cost effectiveness of policies and average VSL amounts, progress with 
respect to incorporating the heterogeneity of VSLs is of subsidiary importance to the more 
fundamental quest for rational risk policies. 
Wholly apart from political feasibility, whether there should be recognition of the 
heterogeneity of VSL for policy purposes depends critically on the source of the heterogeneity. 
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Mexican immigrants have lower VSLs than the rest of the working population, but that is due to 
the limited English language skills of some of these immigrants who face different market 
opportunities.  Much the same is true for African American workers.  Why there are such 
differences in labor market opportunities merits further exploration.  If the observed differences 
are attributable to a market failure, such as labor market discrimination, then incorporating these 
VSL differences in policy evaluations is unwarranted.  Similarly, differences by gender may 
arise because women have lower wages on average.  VSL estimates derived from the standard 
log wage equations are a linear function of wages and the fatality risk coefficient.  Unless the 
fatality risk coefficient is larger for women, which studies have not shown is the case, then 
women will have a lower estimated VSL.  
There is substantial reluctance to make VSL estimates conditional on personal 
characteristics such as gender, race, and ethnicity.  Qualms about differentiating the VSL along 
these dimensions may have a sound economic basis.  Before fully incorporating the implications 
of results pertaining to heterogeneity of VSL based on the person’s demographic profile, there 
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